In the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, the issue of how best to identify speculative bubbles remains in fl ux. This owes to the diffi culty of disentangling irrational investor exuberance from the rational response to lower risk, based on price behavior alone. In response, I introduce a twopillar (price and quantity) approach for fi nancial market surveillance. While asset pricing models comprise a valuable component of the surveillance toolkit, risk taking behavior, and fi nancial vulnerabilities more generally, can also be refl ected in subtler, non-price terms. Though policy makers will always encounter uncertainty when attempting to measure imbalances in fi nancial markets, 'perfect should not be the enemy of the good.' In this spirit, the framework in this paper seems to capture some of the stylized facts of asset booms and busts, and thus could offer policy makers a practical guide as to when to consider leaning against the wind. JEL classifi cation: E44, F37, G12, G15, G18
INTRODUCTION
Financial history reads in many respects as a history of booms, bubbles and busts. The Dutch Tulip Mania (1634-1637), the French Mississippi Bubble (1719-20) , the South Sea Bubble in the United Kingdom (1720), the fi rst Latin American debt boom (1820s), and railway manias in the United Kingdom (1840s) and United States (1870s) are all notable early examples. 2 In the past century, no busts have been more devastating than the Great Depression ushered in by the collapse of world stock markets in 1929. Over the past few decades, the Japanese Heisei bubble in the late 1980s, the various emerging market booms and busts in the 1980s and 1990s, and the equity mania in the late 1990s, offer examples of speculative frenzies gone awry. The threat to fi nancial stability posed by large asset price movements has come into sharper focus over the past decade as the boom during the Great Moderation gave way to the collapse in global credit, real estate, and equity markets. Most recently, questions have been raised as to whether the prolonged use of unusually accommodative monetary policies may be fermenting another asset price bubble.
Much of the debate over the existence and implications of speculative bubbles stems in the fi rst instance from disagreement as to their measurable properties: the term "bubble" has been widely used to mean very different things. 3 Bubble models typically emphasize the self-fulfi lling nature of expected future price changes based on the concept of 'resale optionality.' This enables asset prices to be decomposed into a rational intrinsic yield component (based on discounted future cash fl ows), and an irrational bubble component (based on expectations of future capital gains independent of fundamentals). Other researchers have focused upon the broader social dimensions of bubbles, with their tendency to engulf members of society who typically have little interest in fi nancial matters (Mackay, 1841; Keynes, 1936; Kindleberger, 1978; Chancellor, 2000; Shiller, 2000a; Bonner and Rajiva, 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; and Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) . 4 Yet defi nitional ambiguity and inference problems have long plagued formal studies of speculative bubbles. Distinguishing irrational investor exuberance from the rational response to lower perceived risk is made diffi cult in real time by numerous issues, not least that it can only be known with absolute certainty ex-post whether the optimistic ex-ante projections embedded in asset prices were in fact justifi ed.
Though much of the post-crisis literature has focused, understandably, on the role of credit growth in fermenting asset bubbles, the next major threat to fi nancial stability may well take a different form. Moreover, as capital markets continue to expand in scale and scope, there are reasons to expect their dynamics to increasingly capture the attention of policy makers (Haldane, 2014; Stein, 2014; Feroli and others, 2014; Jones, 2015) . In response, I introduce a simple two-pillar approach to bubble surveillance, based on both price and quantity data in the capital markets. 5 Though by no means a conclusive solution to the age-old diffi culties of crisis prediction, the framework appears to offer promise in capturing some of the stylized facts of asset booms and busts: some of the largest in history have been associated not just with below average risk premia (captured by the 'pricing pillar'), but also with unusually elevated patterns of issuance, trading volumes, fund fl ows, and survey-based return projections (i.e., the 'quantities pillar'). The ability to cross-reference signals from both pillars may give policy makers a richer understanding of the dynamics of asset price cycles and the threats they pose (if at all) to economic stability.
The analysis proceeds as follows. A synthesis of measurement and inference issues that arise in the identifi cation of speculative bubbles is presented in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the contours of the two-pillar approach, drawing upon past asset boom and bust episodes to demonstrate the concept. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are presented in Section 4.
LITERATURE REVIEW -BUBBLE MEASUREMENT AND INFERENCE ISSUES
Speculative bubbles are intuitively recognized to represent situations where market prices signifi cantly exceed the level dictated by fundamentals. 6 Yet broad agreement as to the properties of speculative bubbles has remained elusive virtually ever since the concept of speculation has been invoked. These have not been debates over semantics, but rather quite fundamental issues with important policy implications. For instance how large must be the deviation of prices from those suggested by a fundamental-based model in order for it to be considered 'speculative' or 'irrational'? 7 And for how long must the discrepancy between model-predicted and observed prices persist? Refl ecting the so-called 'joint hypothesis problem,' how do we know a model of fair value, upon which the determination of a bubble is made, is in fact correctly specifi ed in the fi rst instance? Offering a related defense of his seminal effi cient markets asset pricing paradigm, Eugene Fama asserted, Theoretical studies have often focused upon the extrapolation of recent capital gains into the expectation of future capital gains, based on the concepts of 'resale optionality' and the selffulfi lling nature of expected future price changes. Analytically, this allows for a clean delineation between the rational and irrational component of asset prices. 9 For instance, Hirshleifer (1977) suggests speculation refers to the purchase (sale) of a good for later re-sale (re-purchase), rather than for use, in the hope of profi ting from an intervening price change. Harr ison and Kreps (1978) suggest investors exhibit speculative behavior if the right to resell a stock makes them willing to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever. On this basis, an asset bubble exists where investors make a purchase only if they have the ability to subsequently sell the asset at some future date. Kindleberger (1987) defi nes a speculative bubble as a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers-generally speculators, interested in profi ts from trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity. Stiglitz (1990) defi nes a bubble where the reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be high tomorrow-when 'fundamental' factors do not seem to justify such a price. Flood and Garber (1994) categorize a bubble where the positive relationship between price and its expected rate of change implies a similar relationship between price and its actual rate of change. In such conditions, the arbitrary, self-fulfi lling expectation of price changes may drive actual price changes independently of market fundamentals. Shiller (2003, pp. 35, 38 ) describes a bubble in behavioral terms where irrational investors are attracted to an investment because "rising prices encourage them to expect, at some level of consciousness, more price increases. A feedback develops-as people become more and more attracted, there are more and more price increases … the amplifi cation mechanisms that make a bubble grow strong are just that price increases beget more price increases, through human psychology."
From a different perspective, Siegel (2003, p. 14) states formulaically that "a period of rising (or falling) prices in an asset market can be described as a bubble (or negative bubble) at time t if it can be shown that the realized return of the asset over a given future time period, that time period defi ned by the duration of the asset, can be shown to be inconsistent, i.e. more than two standard deviations from the expected return, given the historical risk and return characteristics of that asset at time t." This is an ex-post measure where the real time identifi cation of irrational optimism (or pessimism) is impossible-the presence of a bubble can only be established once fundamental data have been realized over the maturity of the asset. In acknowledging there will almost always be ex-ante and ex-post disagreement about the objective measurement of bubbles, Asness (2014) concludes more generally that to have content, the term should indi cate a price that no reasonable future outcome can justify.
Other sweeping historical analyses have emphasized the predominant feature of speculative asset bubbles as their tendency to draw in members of the general public who are typically aloof in monetary matters. In other words, bubbles can be distinguished from other episodes through their broader impact on society. 10 Yet as colorful as these socio-behavioral descriptions might seem, an obvious limitation is they are not amenable to formal testing.
Empirical tests of speculative bubbles, including those assessing early warning indicators in the context of fi nancial crises, are forced to contend with other diffi cult measurement and inference issues. In setting threshold levels for asset price misalignments, policy makers have to balance the tradeoff between false negatives and false positives (see Kaminsky and others, 1998; Alessi and Detken, 2009; and Gerdesmeier and others, 2009) . If thresholds are set too high, this will increase the likelihood of failing to predict subsequent busts (Type I errors), while setting them too low can come at the cost of incurring frequent warnings of impending busts that do not materialize (Type II errors). Other complications arising from speculative bubble testing include the problems of small sample sizes (dealing with relatively rare events), the stability of estimated coeffi cients (in vs. out of sample), and quantitatively accounting for the pervasive irrational behavioral/social phenomema that are emphasized in descriptive accounts of speculative manias. 11 Broadly speaking, formal tests of speculative asset price bubbles are plagued by estimation and measurement limitations to such a degree that they achieve little of substance in advancing the policy debate over the existence of bubbles in real time-the domain in which policy makers operate. As Gurkaynak, (2005, p. 27) concludes, "Bubble tests do not do a good job of differentiating between misspecifi ed fundamentals and bubbles. This is not only a theoretical concern: For every test that 'fi nds' a bubble, there is another paper that disputes it … The bubble tests teach us little about whether bubbles really exist or not."
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS -A TWO PILLAR FRAMEWORK TO OPERATIONALIZE BUBBLE SURVEILLANCE
The diffi culties associated with identifying asset bubbles in real time suggests a need for policy makers to survey and cross-validate information from a variety of approaches and metrics. Unusually stretched asset prices might refl ect rationally lower compensation for risk, the limits to arbitrage, or irrational behavioral errors. It is unlikely any single variable or model specifi cation will ever be able to offer irrefutable evidence, in real time, that an irrational bubble is in progress-by defi nition, bubbles can only be identifi ed with complete certainty ex-post. Without the benefi t of hindsight to inform their real time assessments, policy makers need to rely on a diverse and timely suite of measures to highlight the accumulation of fi nancial vulnerabilities and concomitant threats to fi nancial stability. It is in this context that supplemental non-price data might help provide authorities with a richer, more nuanced understanding of risk taking 10 In an early example, Mackay (1841) states of the seventeenth century Dutch Tulip Mania, "Nobles, citizens, farmers, mechanics, seamen, footmen, maid-servants, and even chimney-sweeps and old clotheswomen dabbled in tulips." The editorial of the New York Herald wrote in June 1857 that the U.S. railway boom appeared to "infect all classes of society -the country merchant is becoming a city stockjobber, and the honest country farmer has gone off among the gamblers in western land" (Sobel, 1968, p. 96) . As Kindleberger (1978, p. 13) points out in his classic study of speculative manias: "There is nothing so disturbing to one's well being and judgment as to see a friend get rich. When the number of fi rms and households indulging in these practices grows large, bringing in segments of the population that are normally aloof from such ventures, speculation for profi t leads away from normal, rational behavior to what has been described as a mania." Shiller (2000a, p. 2) depicts a societywide mania as the spread of "psychological contagion from person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increase and bringing in a larger and larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of the investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others' successes and partly through a gambler's excitement." 11 Useful summaries of issues encountered in econometric tests of market effi ciency and speculative bubbles are presented in Campbell and others (1997) and Gurkaynak (2005). behavior-potentially enhancing the quality of decision making under uncertainty-even if (as is almost certainly the case) this approach falls short of the proverbial magic bullet solution to the diffi culties of crisis prediction. In a pragmatic sense, 'perfect should not be the enemy of good. ' In recognition of these issues, this paper proposes a conceptually straightforward surveillance approach based on two distinct though complementary pillars: one that is price-based (capturing swings in risk premia or required returns), and another that is quantity-based (tracking issuance, transaction volumes, investor fund fl ows, and investor surveys; see Table 1 ). Periods where (i) risk premiums have been compressed to abnormally low levels, and (ii) issuance, trading activity, fund fl ow data, and survey-based return expectations are unusually elevated, are likely to warrant particular attention from policy makers. 12 Though most of the following analysis is focused on capital markets, this framework can be equally applied to real estate markets. To briefl y illustrate, Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the rent/price ratio (i.e., the rental yield, a conventional valuation metric) and transaction volumes in the U.S. housing market over the 1969-2016 period. The U.S. housing bubble of the mid 2000s was notable in that it constituted a three standard deviation event not just in valuation terms, but also in (non-price) quantity terms. As outlined below, asset booms characterized by extremely unusual valuations and turnover present a signifi cant challenge to benign rational-based explanations. More forcefully, one of the paper's main contentions is that they should put policy makers on high alert. 
The Pricing Pillar
Over time, the search for explanations of asset price movements has shifted in focus. Early asset pricing theories emphasized the role of changes in expected cash fl ows as the key driver of variability in asset prices, with discount rates (comprising risk free rates and a risk premium) assumed constant (Fama, 1970) . Unusually high valuation ratios could be justifi ed only by expectations of unusually strong cash fl ow (dividend or rental) growth in the future. However, subsequent research has showed large asset price increases to have been poor predictors of future cash fl ow growth (see most recently, Cochrane, 2011; and Williams, 2013) , with time variation in discount rates now established as the key source of variation in asset returns. As Figure 2 illustrates, while U.S. stock market returns are strongly negatively correlated with contemporaneous changes in risk premia, the link between stock returns and changes in either long-term bond yields or long-term growth expectations is more muted. Notes: The chart depicts the correlation of excess and real S&P 500 returns to contemporaneous changes in growth expectations, risk-free interest rates, and the equity risk premium. All data are expressed in monthly terms. The sample periods in the above chart refl ect the beginning of the data set (1924), the end of the Bretton Woods system of fi xed exchange rates (1971) , and the beginning of the dataset on survey-based expectations of real growth and infl ation compiled by Consensus Economics (1989). Prior to 1989, long-term nominal growth expectations are proxied by a ten year moving average of nominal GDP growth. The risk free rate is the 10 year Treasury yield. The equity risk premium is an average of three separate measures (see Annex).
For surveillance purposes, valuation metrics (ideally based on real-time information) should demonstrate at least some degree of predictive power over subsequent returns. More importantly, they should display unusual behavior preceding large busts. Figure 3 plots the explanatory power of valuation measures over subsequent returns (since 1953) for the major U.S. asset classes (see the R 2 from regressions of asset returns over different holding periods on initial levels of valuation). The implied equity discount rate is used to forecast stock returns; the rent/price ratio forecasts returns to housing; the credit spread is used to forecast excess credit returns; and the gap between long term Treasury yields and long-term GDP growth forecasts is used to forecast excess Treasury returns (see Annex for details).
In each asset class, valuations appear to have only modest explanatory power over one year returns, but an increasing degree of explanatory power as the investment holding period extends out to a multi-year basis (i.e., asset returns are noisy in the short-run). 13 Of greater consequence is that in the years preceding the three largest crashes in history for each of the major asset classes, 14 risk premiums (required returns) declined to unusually low levels-around 1 to 2 standard deviations below the long-term average (Figure 4 and 5). Following a bust, they rapidly reverted back to more normal levels over the next two years. Notably, each bust was followed by recession-on average, six months after a peak in the case of equities, eight months for housing, and around two years for credit and Treasuries ( Figure 6 ). Notes: Chart depicts the R 2 from regressions of real (equities and housing) or excess (credit and treasury) returns (measured across different holding periods) on the starting level of valuations for each asset class. Regressions are based on non-overlapping holding periods over the 1953-2013 sample. In the case of stocks, real returns are regressed on the market-implied real equity discount rate; in the case of housing, real returns are regressed on the rent/price ratio; for investment grade credit, excess returns on BBB credit are regressed on BBB spreads over duration-matched Treasuries; and for Treasuries, 5 year bond returns 5 years forward are regressed on the bond risk premium, measured as the 5y5y rate less the 5y5y forward consensus estimate of growth and infl ation. See Annex for more details on the valuation measures.
Figure 4
Risk Premiums (as a z-score) in the Years Before and After Large Busts Source: Author's estimates, Haver, Bloomberg.
Notes: Based on the average z-score (depicting the number of standard deviations from the mean) of required returns for the three largest crashes, for each asset class, from fi ve years prior to the commencement of a bust to two and half years after. Dates in parenthesis for each asset class refer to the month in which the bust commenced. Sample period commences in 1924 for stocks and BBB credit, and 1953 for housing and Treasuries, ending in 2013. From a broader perspective, policy makers might also glean information as to the generalized environment for risk taking by examining equity and bond valuations across global markets. In this regard, it is interesting to note that based on a sample of 15 developed and 10 emerging markets since 1989, the market-implied real cost of equity (i.e. the required return to hold stocks) for the average country index was more than 1 standard deviation below its historical average prior to the worldwide equity crashes commencing in 2000 and 2008 (Figure 7) . 15 In both instances, even the cheapest decile of country equity indices were more expensive than historical averages. World bond markets have not suffered the same type of generalized crash over the post-1989 period, 15 Proxies for the equity risk premium provide a similar message. I report results here for the market-implied cost of equity rather than the equity risk premium for two reasons: (i) the cost of equity is a superior forecaster of future stock returns than the equity risk premium; and (ii) stocks are a perpetuity with a duration that is constantly in fl ux, meaning that defl ating the cost of equity by a bond yield at one point in the curve could be akin to comparing apples with oranges. 98 though it should be noted that the average cross-country measure of risk premia in sovereign bonds (the difference between the 5 year rate, 5 years forward, and consensus estimates for growth and infl ation over the same period) is currently close to record lows (Figure 8) . 16 Moreover the most expensive decile of countries on this measure are now almost 3 standard deviations richer than their historical norm. Notes: Chart depicts the average, top decile and bottom decline z-score (depicting the number of standard deviations from the mean) for the 'Wicksellian' sovereign bond risk premia, measured as the 5 year rate, 5 years forward, minus consensus estimates for growth and infl ation over the same period. See Annex for details. The sample includes 15 developed markets and 10 emerging markets, comprising 94 percent of the market capitalization of the Citigroup World Government bond benchmark index. Data from September 1989 -January 2016.
The Quantities Pillar
The aforementioned results suggest asset pricing models should comprise a key component of the surveillance toolkit. Nevertheless, risk taking behavior, and fi nancial vulnerabilities more generally, might also be refl ected in subtler, non-price terms-beyond what asset valuations alone can signify. Additionally, 'top down' asset pricing models are subject to considerable estimation error: forward looking inputs are unobservable and small changes in discount rates for long duration assets can exert a very large impact on estimates of fair value (recall Figure 1) . As such, (non-price) quantity data may have a useful cross-referencing role for the purposes of fi nancial surveillance. 17 Against this backdrop, the analysis that follows is based on the 'bottom up' information content in: (i) the quantity and quality of capital market issuance; (ii) trading volumes; (iii) investor fund fl ows; and (iv) investor surveys. This may be the fi rst proposal for a multi-faceted cross-asset 'quantities pillar' to be employed as a supplement to more traditional valuation-based surveillance analysis. 18 It should be noted however that the absence of lengthy time series and comparable cross country data necessarily makes the following more interpretative than the earlier analysis.
(i) Quantity and Composition of Capital Market Issuance
The fi nancial crisis of 2008 yielded important insights regarding the information content embedded in the increasing quantity and declining quality of capital market issuance. Credit markets are particularly amenable to scrutiny in non-price terms as implicit leverage, subordination, illiquidity, and a paucity of investor protection features allow investors to take on risk in ways that might transcend conventional measurement through spreads alone. Issuance patterns in the structured credit, asset-backed and riskier bond and loan markets underwent profound shifts in the years leading up to global fi nancial crisis, notably in that securitization issuance volumes surged in the most complex, risky, and opaque market segments that had previously played only a peripheral role in the industry (Segoviano and others, 2013) .
For instance, between 2000 and 2005, annual U.S. subprime mortgage issuance rose from $100 billion to more than $600 billion, lifting the subprime share of total U.S. mortgage origination from a low of 6.9 percent to a peak of 20.1 percent. These loans featured heavily in the explosive growth in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Over the same period, the rapid emergence of new and federally-unregulated players as a force in U.S. mortgage markets saw private-label residential mortgage backed security (MBS) issuance increase from $150 billion to $1.2 trillion, increasing their share of total MBS issuance from 18 percent to 56 percent. 19 Between 2000 and 2007, global issuance of CDOs increased more than six times to $1 trillion, while issuance of CDO-squared product increased eleven-fold to $300 billion. Far from refl ecting just a U.S. phenomena, between 2000 and the onset of the crisis, annual European securitization issuance increased from €80 billion to just over €700 billion. More broadly, other forms of high-risk debt issuance also increased markedly, notably high yield bonds, leveraged loans, covenant-lite loans, and payment-in-kind (PIK) notes (Figure 9 ). 20 17 Traditionally, to the extent that non-price data has been examined in the context of asset bubbles, the focus has been almost exclusively on credit growth, dating back to at least Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1986 Minsky ( , 1992 ). Yet credit growth can occur in ways that escape conventional measurement (especially in shadow banking), and moreover, bubbles might still present a major threat to fi nancial stability even in the absence of leverage, particularly where their bursting drives risk premiums out to unusually wide levels that prohibit capital formation. 18 Related analysis of both price and quantity-based data appear in BIS (2012) and IMF (2014) . In a more limited context, Stein (2013) examines the fi nancial stability implications derived from patterns in credit issuance, while Feroli and others (2014) focus on investor fund fl ows. 19 More than 45 percent of high cost fi rst-time mortgages were originated by independent mortgage companies that were not regulated by federal agencies (Bernanke, 2008) . 20 PIK securities are a fi nancial instrument that pay interest to investors in the form of additional debt or equity instead of a cash coupon. They are attractive to companies who need (or prefer) to avoid making cash outlays to investors. Cove-lite issuance refers to debt obligations which do not contain the usual protective covenants for the benefi t of the lending party.
Figure 9
The Pre-Crisis Boom in Risky Credit Issuance Source: Author's estimates, Inside Mortgage Finance, Dealogic, AFME, SIFMA , Based on data back to the 1920s, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) establish that compositional shifts in the pattern of debt issuance between high and low quality fi rms, including the high yield share of total nonfi nancial debt issuance, have had strong predictive power over future corporate bond returns (exceeding the explanatory power of spreads alone). A high and/or rising share of debt market issuance from lower quality fi rms can portend sharp credit spread widening episodes ( Figure 10) . As lower quality fi rms face binding fi nancing constraints (unlike higher quality peers, they do not enjoy an indefi nitely open window to raise capital), a relative fl urry of lower quality debt issuance can signify unusually easy fi nancing conditions and thus should be interpreted as an inherently procyclical development (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) . 21 Similarly, in a study of the fi rst high yield credit boom and bust cycle of the 1980s, Kaplan and Stein (1993) describe how the value of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) grew dramatically from just under $1 billion in 1980 to over $60 billion in 1988 (before collapsing below $20 billion in the credit market bust of the following year). This growth was fuelled in part by the introduction of deferred or payment-in-kind interest features in high-yield bonds, which further reduced the protection of already junior creditors and was analogous to investors willingly accepting low or even negative ex-ante risk premia.
The implication from these fi ndings is that policy makers need to go beyond simply monitoring the level of credit spreads or the growth in aggregate credit-the composition and quality of credit issuance may be even more important. Drawing on the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) where corporate managers ('insiders') exploit their informational advantages (in that they know more about the value of their fi rms than outsiders), patterns of equity issuance that accelerate into a large run up in stock valuations can also be of interest for fi nancial surveillance purposes. Bernstein and Arnott (2003) show that the two largest booms (and busts) in U.S. stock market history-the late 1920s and late 1990s-coincided with the fastest ever rates of aggregate U.S. net equity issuance. 22 Nelson (1999) fi nds each percentage point of U.S. net share issuance is associated with a market that is 5 percent overvalued relative to historical averages. At the single stock level, infl ated valuations have been found to be a key element of IPOs which helps to explain their subsequent long-run underperformance (Ritter, 1991; Schultz, 2003, Baker and Xuan, 2009) . 23 Since stock prices are positively correlated, and all fi rms are incentivized to issue equity when valuations are high, aggregate equity issues tend to cluster around market peaks (Korajczyk and others, 1990; Baker and Wurgler, 2000) . Gilchrist and others (2004) show that as stock prices move well above measures of fundamental value, managers rationally respond by issuing new equity which has the effect of reducing the cost of capital and increasing the desire to invest. 24 The corporate 102 102 investment boom in the U.S. accompanying the late 1990s equity market bubble is a notable recent example. 25 Based on U.S. data since 1965, Figure 11 illustrates the empirical link between an unusually low cost of capital, and elevated net equity issuance (gross issuance less gross buybacks) the following year. 26 Drawing on the experience of the largest stock booms in the U.S., Germany, China and India, Figure 12 similarly shows that initial public offering (IPO) volumes tend to surge when the cost of raising capital (i.e. the required return for investors to hold stock) is unusually low. At the global level, the surge in the number (and value) of global IPOs was especially notably in the late 1990s. These observations refl ect the notion that corporate managers are incentivized to issue securities when prices are unusually high relative to fundamentals. 27 Collectively, the procyclical fi ndings on debt and equity issuance suggest a role for policy makers to closely monitor changes in the quantity and composition of capital market fi nancing. Notes: Annual data based on the S&P 500 from 1965-2013. The regression measures the 'voluntary' equity issuance response (i.e. when real returns have been positive over the past fi ve years) of corporate managers to different levels of risk premia (required return) in the stock market. The required return on stocks (an average of three model outputs, as defi ned in the Annex) is a statistically signifi cant predictor (at the 1 percent level) of net equity issuance the following year. 25 From 1992 to 2000, the non-residential investment share of GDP rose from 8.5 to 13.2 percent (a record). 26 Capital raisings occurring around recessions, when valuations are depressed, are not of interest here. 27 In another illustration of the 'insider selling' concept, private equity management teams have also been found to invest a substantially smaller fraction of their net worth in post-buyout equity vis-à-vis pre-buyout equity: managers tend to "cash out" a large fraction of their pre-buyout equity investment at the time of the exiting buyout, and may therefore have an incentive to participate in overpriced exits (Kaplan and Stein, 1993) . Kaplan and Stein (1993) also fi nd that ahead of a downturn in company fortunes, fi nanciers with the most intimate knowledge of deals such as relatively risk averse bank lenders and private subordinated debt fi nanciers ('insiders') begin exiting while public subordinated lenders ('outsiders') increase their exposure.
Figure 12 IPO Volumes vs. Stock Valuations in Equity Booms
Source: Author's estimates, Dealogic.
Notes: IPO volumes in millions of $US, shown 5 years prior to and two years after the peak in IPO volumes.
(ii) Trading/Transaction Volumes
Periods of unusually elevated trading activity may also have a role to play in surveillance work. Classical asset pricing theory suggests that where investors share the same beliefs and information, and perceive one another to be rational, the incentive to transact (at the expense of one another) would evaporate. As a result, trading activity would collapse to refl ect only unanticipated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing needs of investors. However, these motives seem far too small to account for the enormous trading volumes observed in reality, most notably during periods of rapidly rising asset prices. Though trading volume is frequently relegated to a separate and effectively unconnected area of inquiry from studies of market effi ciency, it is hard to imagine a fully satisfying asset pricing model-in either the rational or behavioral genres-that does not give a front-and-center role to trading volume (Hong and Stein, 2007) . As Cochrane (2011 Cochrane ( , p. 1079 observes in a sweeping survey, "every asset price bubble-defi ned by popular use of the label-has coincided with a trading frenzy, from Dutch tulips in 1620 to Miami condos in 2006." 28 Figure 13 displays the relationship between the growth in real stock prices and growth in trading volumes across a variety of equity markets during some the largest bull markets in history: the 'Roaring 1920s' episode, Japan's Heisei bubble in the late 1980s, the U.S. technology bubble in the late 1990s, 28 Kindleberger (2011, p. 15) likens speculative manias to a "frenzied pattern of purchases" refl ected in rapidly rising trading volumes, a phenomena synonymous with the 'greater fool theory' whereby more and more euphoric investors purchase securities solely in anticipation of future short-term capital gains. For a related discussion of transaction volumes in the Dutch Tulip Mania, see Mackay (1841) and Garber (2001) ; for the South Sea stock bubble of 1720, see Carlos, Neal, and Wandschneider (2006) ; for the U.S. stock bull market of the 1920s, see Thomas and Morgan-Witts (1979) and Hong and Stein (2007) ; for a similar phenomena during the 1990s technology bubble, see Cochrane (2003) Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) ; Ofek and Richardson (2003); and Hong and others (2006) . and China's equity boom in the mid-2000s. A similar pattern for transaction volumes unfolded in the case of the recent U.S. housing market bubble (see Figure 1) . Average daily trading volumes in the U.S. mortgage backed security market increased fi ve-fold in absolute terms between 2000 and 2008 (and doubled relative to lower risk Treasury and corporate bond markets), while high yield trading activity also rose sharply relative to investment grade credit trading activity prior to the crisis. 29 Source: Author's estimates, Bloomberg.
Notes: The top panel depicts the simple average z-score (depicting the number of standard deviations from the mean) for trading volume and real price growth (measured over fi ve years) during the largest real price boom in the following 24 countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and the U.S.
(iii) Investor Fund Flows
Though cross-border capital fl ows have long featured in the literature on balance of payments crises, only in recent times have researchers begun to examine the fi nancial stability implications arising from herding and redemption patterns in institutional investment funds. Elevated fund fl ows can put upward pressure on prices (particularly in small or illiquid asset classes), which in turn attract more fl ows from underinvested and/or underperforming investors Ellison, 1997, 1999; Vayanos and Woolley, 2013; Jones, 2015) . There are few natural circuit breakers to this feedback loop. The fund fl ows of unlevered investment managers operating in the 'relative performance derby' vis-à-vis their peer group can be a locus of fi nancial instability to the extent they are motivated by herding considerations (Woolley, 2010; Cai and others, 2012; Feroli and others, 2014; Jones, 2015) . 30 The pattern of investor fund fl ows into and out of asset classes suggests they should be monitored by authorities. Investor fund fl ows (based on EPFR data) appear to gradually rise over a period of years and peak at around one standard deviation above average just prior to a large decline in asset prices (Figure 14) . In the subsequent bust, cumulative fund fl ows fall to more than one standard deviation below average before markets trough. Notes: Average z-score (depicting the number of standard deviations from the mean) of cumulative three-year fl ows (normalized as a share of total fund assets) across developed market equity, emerging market equity, emerging market hard currency fi xed income, emerging market local currency fi xed income, global high yield credit, and U.S. Treasuries. A 'bust' is defi ned as the largest peak-to-trough decline in real returns for each asset class between 1996-2014 (or earliest available). 30 Positive feedback trading can result from no manager wanting to be last in or last out, with the effect most pronounced in relatively risky and illiquid markets. Chen and others (2010) show that redemptions from mutual funds holding illiquid assets create incentives like those facing depositors in a bank run (see the classic model of Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) . Money market funds can face a particularly acute form of vulnerability to runs. To the extent they highlight the irrational extrapolation of past returns into investor estimates of future returns, survey data may also serve as another tool in the asset bubble surveillance toolkit. Shiller (2000b) developed a survey-based indicator to assess whether stock market investors were buying stocks purely on the basis of expectations of a short term increase in the market. Muellbauer (2012) argues that central banks should regularly survey home buyers regarding their expectations for capital appreciation for this express purpose, especially where there might be a large degree of uncertainty over model-based estimates of 'fair value' (as is typically the case for housing). Survey data reveal that after a run up in asset prices, subjective expectations of returns tend to be high while objective expected returns tend to be low (Ilmanen, 2011; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2013; Williams, 2013) .
(iv) Surveys of Return Expectations
Unlike past cyclical highs in the U.S. stock market, survey-based estimates of expected returns appear relatively benign at the present time (as a relatively new fi eld of research, lengthy time series of investor expectations for risky asset returns have been compiled only for the U.S. stock market). At the peak of the 1990s equity bubble, investor return expectations (as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the Duke University CFO Survey) were around three times higher than the (objective) cyclically-adjusted earnings yield (Figure 15 ). Not only were return expectations high in the Duke CFO survey, they were also rising at the same time the earnings yield collapsed in response to booming stock prices. Just prior to the late-2007 market peak, survey-based return expectations were again rising and well above the earnings yield measure of future returns.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The cost of bursting bubbles, and the inability of authorities to identify the accumulation of excesses in asset markets prior to the global fi nancial crisis, suggests the need for an augmented surveillance framework. While acknowledging that the identifi cation of asset bubbles will always remain a diffi cult task and require some element of subjectivity-a task that cannot be reduced to a single equation-the analysis presented in this paper suggests that a framework anchored in both price and non-price terms offers an encouraging starting point. Asset pricing models, no matter how elaborate, should be the place to begin, not fi nish, surveillance work. By measuring risk taking behavior, and fi nancial vulnerabilities more generally, in ways that escape conventional asset valuation-based analysis, this paper argues quantity data offer a promising, complementary way to enrich our understanding of asset market dynamics.
The broader issue of what policy makers should do about asset bubbles, while beyond the scope of the present analysis, constitutes a critical related objective of future research. In the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, much emphasis has been placed on the role of monetary and macroprudential policy in circumventing conventional leverage-driven asset booms. However, the dimensions of the next crisis will not necessarily follow those of the most recent cycle. Characteristics of the rapidly growing asset management industry-including incentives for asset managers to knowingly 'ride bubbles'-present policy makers with challenges that will likely require examination of a new suite of policy tools if authorities are to mitigate future threats to fi nancial instability. In conjunction with ongoing analysis of early warning surveillance techniques, these areas should be fertile ground for future research. growth and infl ation over the same period (a negative Wicksellian risk premium suggests bond yields are too low relative to the neutral rate, as proxied by long-run estimates of growth and infl ation). This is essentially a special case of the Taylor rule for the bond market, where the neutral rate is captured by long term consensus expectations of real growth and infl ation, and the infl ation and output gap are closed. Wherever possible, zero-coupon bond yields are used (in their absence, the yield to maturity). Finally, real GDP growth and infl ation expectations are measured out to ten years via a survey of professional forecasters compiled by Consensus Economics. These data, though not entirely free of limitations, are interesting from a number of perspectives: they are not subject to revisions or serious time lags as is the case for many macrofi nancial time series routinely employed in studies of asset price predictability; they are available on a consistent cross-country basis; and they can capture market expectations of structural breaks or changes in macro variables, upon which estimates of fundamentals are based. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the fi rst time such data have been used in a comparable study.
